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STEVENSON, JAQUES & CO. v. McLEAN.
Where negotiations for the sale of goods are pending between parties, and am
offer of terms is made by one party, such offer remains in force as a continuing ofbr
until the time for accepting or rejecting it has arrived, unless it be revoked before
acceptance. And a revocation in order to be operative must be communicated to
the other party before he dispatches his acceptance.
Byrne 4- Co. v. Leon Van Trienhoven 4- Co., 49 L. J. C. P. 31"6, followed and
approved.

THE facts and arguments appear at length in the judgment.
Waddy, Q. C., and H. Shield, for the plaintiffs.
Cave, Q. C., and Wormald, for the defendant.
LuSH, J.-This is an action for non-delivery of a quantity of
iron which it was alleged the defendant contracted to sell to the
plaintiffs at forty shillings per ton net cash. The trial took place
before me at the last assizes at Leeds, when a verdict was given for
the plaintiffs for 19001., subject to further consideration on the
question whether, under the circumstances, the correspondence
between the parties amounted to a contract, and subject also, if
I Since the foregoing was written, it has been decided in Michigan-Moss v.
Cummins, 6 N. W. Rep. 843-that money paid to a tax collector, under compulsion
of process valid on its face, cannot be recovered back as an illegal exaction, upon
the ground that the supervisor, in making the assessment, in violation of his oath,
deliberately assessed all the property of the township at a rate much below its
actual value.
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twe verdict should stand, to a reference, if required by the defendant, to ascertain the amount of the damages.
The plaintiffs are makers of iron and iron merchants at Middlesborough. The defendant being possessed of warrants for iron
which he had originally bbught of the plaintiffs, wrote on the 24th
of September to the plaintiffs from London, where he carries on
his business: " I see that No. 3 has been sold for immediate
delivery at thirty-nine shillings, which means a higher price for
warrants. Could you get me an offer for the whole or part of my
warrants? I have 3800 tons, and the brands you know."
On the 26th one of the plaintiffs wrote from Liverpool: "Your
letter has followed me here. The pig-iron trade is at present very
excited, and it is difficult to decide whether prices will be maintained or fall as suddenly as they have advanced. Sales are*
being made freely, for forward delivery chiefly, but not in warrants. It may, however, be found advisable to sell the warrants
as maker's iron. I would recommend you to fix your price, and
if you will write me your limit to Middlesborough, I shall probably be able to wire you something definite on Monday."
This letter was crossed by a letter written on the same day by
the clerk of one Fossick, the defendant's broker in London, and
which was in these terms:"Referring to R. A. Machan's letter to you re warrants, I have
seen him again to-day, and he considers thirty-nine shillings too
low for same. At forty shillings he says he would consider an
offer. However, I shall be obliged by your kindly wiring me, if
possible, your best offer for all or part of the warrants he has to
dispose of."
On the 27th (Saturday) the plaintiffs sent to Fossick the following telegram :"Cannot make an offer to-day; warrants rather easier. Several
sellers think might get thirty-nine shillings and sixpence if you
could wire firm offer, subject reply. Tuesday, noon."
- In answer to this Fossick wrote on the same day :"Your telegram duly to hand re warrants. I have seen Mr.
Machan, but he is not inclined to make a firm offer. I do not
think he is likely to sell at thirty-nine shillings and sixpence, but
will probably prefer to wait. Please let me know immediately you
get any likely offer."
On the same day the defendant, who had then received the
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Liverpool letter of the 26th, wrote himself to the plaintiffs, as
follows
"Mr. Fossick's clerk showed me a telegram from him yesterday,
mentioning thirty-nine shillings for No. 3, as present price, forty
shillings for forward delivery. I instructed the clerk to wire you
that I would now sell for forty shillings, net cash, open till Monday." No such telegram was sent by Fossick's clerk.
The plaintiffs were thus, on the 28th (Sunday), in possession of
both letters, the one from Fossick stating that the defendant was
not inclined to make a firm offer; and the other from the defendant himself, to the effect that he would sell for forty shillings, net
cash, and would hold it open all Monday. This, it was admitted,
must have been the meaning of "open till Monday."
On the Monday morning, at 9.42, the plaintiffs telegraphed to
the defendant: "1Please wire whether you would accept forty for
delivery over two months; or, if not, longest limit you would
g;ve."
This telegram was received at the office at Moorgate at 10.1
A. M., and was delivered at the defendant's office in the Old Jewry
shortly afterwards.
No answer to this telegram was sent by the defendant, but after
its receipt he sold the warrants, through Fossick, for forty shillings, net cash, and at 1.25 sent off a telegram -to the plaintiffs:
"Have sold all my warrants here for forty, net, to-day." This
telegram reached Middlesborough at 1.46, and was delivered in
due course.
Before its arrival at Middlesborough, however, and at 1.34, the
plaintiffs telegraphed to defendant: "Have received your price
for payment next Monday. Write you fully by post."
By the usage of the iron market at Middlesborough, contracts
made on a Monday for cash are payable on the following Monday.
At 2.6 on the same day, after receipt of the defendant's telegram announcing the sale through Fossick, the plaintiffs telegraphed: "Have your telegram following our advice to you of
sale, per your instructions, which we cannot revoke, but rely upon
your carrying out."
The defendant replied: "Your two telegrams received; but
your sale was too late. Your sale was not per my instructions."
And to this the plaintiffs rejoined: "Have sold your warrants on
terms stated in your letter of 27th."
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The iron was sold by the plaintiffs to one Walker at forty-one
shillings and sixpence, and the contract-note was signed before one
o'clock on Monday. The price of iron rapidly rose, and the
plaintiffs had to buy in fulfilment of their contract at a considerable advance on forty shillings.
The only question of fact raised at the trial was, whether the
relation between the parties was that of principal and agent, or
that of buyer and seller.
The jury found it was that of buyer and seller, and no objection
has been taken to this finding.
Two objections were relied on by the defendant-first, it was
contended that the telegram sent by the plaintiffs on the Monday
morning was a rejection of the defendant's offer, and a new proposal on the plaintiffs' part, and that the defendant had therefore
a right to regard it as putting an end to the original negotiation.
Looking at the form of the telegram, the time when it was sent,
and the state of the iron market, I cannot think this is its fair
meaning. The plaintiff Stevenson said he meant it only as an
inquiry, expecting an answer for his guidance, and this, I think,
is the sense in which the defendant ought to have regarded it.
It is apparent throughout the correspondence, that the plaintiffs
did not contemplate buying the iron on speculation, but that their
acceptance of the defendant's offer depended on their finding some
one to take the warrants off their hands. All parties knew that
the market was in an unsettled state, and that no one could predict
at the early hour when the telegram was sent how the prices would
range during the day. It was reasonable that, under these circumstances, they should lesire to know before business began whether
they were to be at liberty-in case of, and to make any and what,
concession as to the time or times of delivery, which would be the
time or times of payment, or whether the defendant was determined to adhere to the terms of his letter; and it was highly
unreasonable that the plaintiffs should have intended to close the
negotiation while it was uncertain whether they could find a buyer
or not, having the whole of the business hours of the day to look
for one. Then, again, the form of telegram is one of inquiry. It
is not "I offer forty for delivery over two months," which would
have likened the case to -yde v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 334, where one
party offered his estate for 10001., and the other answered by
offering 9501. Lord LANGDALE, in that case, held, that after the
9501. had been refused, the party offering it could not, by then
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agreeing to the original proposal, claim the estate, for the negotiation was at an end by the refusal of his counter proposal. Here
there is no counter proposal. The words are, "1Please wire
whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months, or,
if not, the longest limit you would give." There is nothing
specific by way of offer or rejection, but a mere inquiry, which
should have been answered and not treated as a rejection of the
offer. This ground of objection therefore fails.
The remaining objection was one founded on a well-known passage in Pothier, which was supposed to have been sanctioned by the
Court of Queen's Bench in Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term Rep. 653,
that in order to constitute a contract there must be the assent or
concurrence of the two minds at the moment when the offer is
accepted; and if, when the offer is made, and time is given to the
other party to determine whether he will accept or reject it, the
proposer changes his mind before the time arrives, although no
notice of the withdrawal has been given to the other party, the
option of accepting it is gone. The case of Cooke v. Oxley, does
not appear to me to warrant the inference which has been drawn
from it, or the supposition that the judges ever intended to lay
down such a doctrine. The declaration stated a proposal by the
defendant to sell to the plaintiff two hundred and sixty-six hogsheads of sugar at a specific price, that the plaintiff desired time
to agree to or dissent from the proposal till four in the afternoon,
and that defendant agreed to give the time, and promised to sell
and deliver, if the plaintiff would agree to purchase and give notice
thereof before four o'clock. The court arrested the judgment, on
the ground that there was no consideration for the defendant's
agreement to wait till four o'clock, and that the alleged promise to
wait was nudum pactum. All that the judgment affirms is, that a
party who gives time to another to accept or reject a proposal is
not bound to wait until the time expires. And this is perfectly
consistent with legal principles and with subsequent authorities,
which have been supposed to conflict with Cooke v. Oxley. It is
clear that a unilateral promise is not binding, and that if the person who makes an offer revokes it before it has been accepteo,
which he is at liberty to do, the negotiation is at an end: see
BRoutledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653. But in the absence of an
intermediate revocation, a party who makes a proposal by letter to
another is considered as repeating the offer every instant of time
till the letter has reached its destination and the correspondent has
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had a reasonable time to answer it: Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. &
Ald. 681. "Common sense tells us," said Lord COTTENHAM, in
Dunlop v. Biggins, 1 H. L. C. 381, "that transactions cannot go
on without such a rule." It cannot make any difference whether
the negotiation is carried on by post, or by telegraph, or by oral
message. If the offer is not retracted, it is in force as a continuing offer till the time for accepting or rejecting it has arrived. But
if it is retracted, there is an end of the proposal. Cooke v. Oxley,
if decided the other wa.y, would have negatived the right of the
proposing party to revoke his offer.
Taking this to be the effect of the decision in Cooke v. Oxley,
the doctrine of Pothier, before alluded to, which is undoubtedly
contrary to the spirit of the English law, has never been affirmed
in our courts. Singularly enough, the very reasonable proposition
that a revocation is nothing till it has been communicated to the
other party, has not until recently been laid down, no case having
apparently arisen to call for a decision upon the point. In
America it was decided some years ago that "an offer cannot be
withdrawn unless the withdrawal reaches the party to whom it is
addressed before his letter of reply announcing the acceptance has
been transmitted:" Tayloe v. Merchant Fire Insurance Co., 9
How. Sup. Court Rep. 390; and in jByrne & Co. v. Leon Van
Trlenhoven &- Co., 49 L. J. C. P. 316, my brother LINDLEY, in
an elaborate judgment, adopted this view, and held that an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes, and in point of
law, no revocation at all.
It follows that, as no notice of withdrawal of his offer to sell at
forty shillings, net cash, was given by the defendant before the
plaintiffs sold to Walker, they had a right to regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract, which
was initiated by the proposal, complete and binding on both
parties.
My judgment must, therefore, be for the plaintiffs for 19001.,
but this amount is liable to be reduced by an arbitrator to be
agreed on by the parties, or, if they cannot agree within a week,
to be nominated by me. If no arbitrator is appointed, or if the
amount be not reduced, the judgment will stand for 19001. The
costs of the arbitration to be in the arbitrator's discretion.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
The case of Byrne v. Tran Tienhoven,
referred to in the foregoing case, also

reported in Law Rep., 5 C. P. Div. 344,
was this:
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On the 1st of October 1879, the defendants wrote from Cardiff offering
goods for sale, at a stated price, to the
plaintiffs, who resided at New York.
The plaintiffs received this offer on the
I Ith October, and accepted it by telegram on the same day, and also by letter
posted on the 15th; but in the meantime, viz., on the 8th October, the defendants had posted another letter to the
plaintiffs, withdrawing their offer of the
1st, which withdrawal reached the plaintiffs on the 18th, seven days after they
had sent their telegram. of acceptance.
The defendants refusing to fulfil their
offer, the plaintiffs brought suit, and
upon full c:onsideration it was held that
the withdrawal was inoperative, it not
reaching the plaintiffs before they had
actually accepted the offer, both by telegram and letter; they having no reason
to suppose it was withdrawn. But the
same point had been long before decided
by the Court of Sessions in Scotland, in
2Momson v. James, 18 Dunl. 1 (1855),
which decision was apparently not cited
in either of the late cases stated above.
The facts there were that on the 26th
November 1853, the defendant sent a
letter by mail to the plaintiff, offering
him 64001. for the purchase of an estate
called "Renniston."
On the 1st December, between 2.30 and 4.30 P.M.,
the plaintiff posted an acceptance of the
offer, which was received by the defendant on the 2d, but in the meantime, viz.,
on the 1st, he had changed his mind,
and before 3 P. x., he posted a withdrawal of his offer, which also reached
the plaintiff on the 2d, and the defendant refusing to take the estate and pay
the 64001., this action was brought for
the purchase-money. The point was
elaborately argued and fully considered,
and the action was sustained; Lord
President, saying, "The real question
in issue between the parties is, whether
the offer was recalled before it was
accepted; I hold that the mere posting
of a letter of recall does not make that

letter effectual as a recall, so as from
the moment of itE
posting to prevent the
completion of the cont.-act by the other's
acceptance. An offer is nothing until it
is communicated to the party to whom
it is made. In like manner, I think the
recall or withdrawal of an offer that has
been communicated can have no efbect
until the recall or withdrawal has been
communicated, or may be assumed to
have been communicated to the party
holding the offer. An offer, pure and
unconditional, puts it in the power of
the party to whom it is addressed to
accept the offer, until, by the lapse of a
reasonable time he has lost the right, or
until the party who has. made the offer
gives notice,-that is, makes known-that he withdraws it. The purpose of
the recall is to prevent the party to
whom the offer was made from acting
upon the offer by accepting it. This
necessarily implies pre-communication to
the party who is to be so prevented."
He then proceeds to distinguish this
kind of revocation-voluntary revocation-from thit caused by death or
insanity of the party making the offer.
Admitting that in such cases the revocation, or rather interruption or suspension, takes effect immediately, and without notice to the adverse party, Le shows
conclusively the difference between 'those
and a voluntary withdrawal by a living
and sane man. Lord IvoRY and Lord
DEAS also delivered elaborate judgments to the same effect, and the case
contains one of the best discussions of
the subject to be found anywhere. The
case is reprinted in Langdell's valuable
Collection of Cases on Contracts, p. 125.
A few cases seem to incline the other
way; the first of which is Head v.Diggon, 3 Man. & Ry. 97 (1828), in the
King's Bench, and apparently not elsewhere reported. The facts there were
that on Thursday, April 17th 1828, the
plaintiff and defendant being in verbal
negotiation for the purchase of a lot of
wool, and after the defendant had fixed
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his price, the plaintiff requested time to
consider of his terms. The defendant
said he would give him a week, to which
the plaintiff replied that three or four
days would be enough. The defendant
then wrote and gave the plaintiff the
following paper:
"Shelford, April 17, 1828.
Offered Mr. Head, the under wool,
with three days' grace from the above
date: forty Sussex head and lamb, &c.,
91. 10s. as per sample, delivered in good
condition.
F. DiGOON."
On Mot'day the 21st, the plaintiff
called on the defendant to accept the
wool and make arrangements for the delivery. The defendant said as the plaintiff had not seen him or written him on
Sunday, he had given a price for the
wool to a Mr. Fyson, and refused to
deliver the wool. Being sued for nondelivery of the wool, HOLROYD, J.,
was of opinion the plaintiff had failed
in proving a contract binding upon both
parties, and on the authority of Cooke v.
Oxley, directed a nonsuit, which was
confirmed by the King's Bench; Lord
TENTERDEN, C. J., saying, "Must not
both parties be bound, or is it sufficient
if only one is bound ? You contend
that the buyer was to be free during the
three days, and that the seller was to be
bound. If the contract is to be taken
as made only at the time when the plaintiff signified his acceptance of the offer,
it is disproved by the circumstance that
the defendant did not then agree."
BAYY, J., added, "I am of the same
opinion; and in Boutledge v. Grant, it
was held by the Court of Common Pleas
that unless beth parties are bound,
neither is bound."
Here the offer was accepted and made
known to the offerer, within the time
allowed (supposing Sunday to be not a
business day), and before any notice of
retraction or change of mind upon the

part of the defendant ; yet, under the
influence of Cooke v. Oxley, the sale
was held not binding upon the vendor.
Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463
(1876), discusses this point quite fully.
The defendant there, on Wednesday,
June 10th, gave the plaintiff an offer to
sell him an estate for 8001., "this offer
to be left over until Friday, 9 b'clock
A. 31." On the Thursday morning preceding, the plaintiff in fact decided to
accept but did not immediately notify
the defendant, supposing he had until
9 A. m. the next day to do so. On
Thursday afternoon the defendant sold
the property to another party, but sent
no notice to the plaintiff. The latter,
however, heard of it, and before 9
o'clock Friday morning, distinctly informed the defendant orally and in
writing, that he accepted his offer; the
defendant saying, "You are too late;
I have sold the property."
On a bill in equity for a specific performance by the plaintiff, Vice-Chancellor BAcoN held that the contract was
binding, and the acceptance being within
the time limited, and before any notice
given of any retraction, withdrawal, or
sale to another, that the defendant was
bound to fulfil. This judgment was, however, reversed on appeal, principally, it
appears, because, although the defendant
had not sent the plaintiff any notice of
his change of mind; yet, in fact, the
plaintiff had heard of it before giving
any notice of acceptance, and that, therefore, there never was a union of minds
at the same time, and so no completed
contract.
How far these decisions as to revocation apply also to an acceptance of an
offer, and whether that also should take
effect when received, and not when
posted in some distant city, as so many
cases and judges seem to hold, may be
considered in a future note.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

